Playbooks missing giving-up-points section

It's not a play I have ever seen in any of the defensive playbooks handed out to me by any of the 10 defensive co-ordinators I have had over the years, nor does it have its own section that you can easily reference in any offensive handbook.

If Super Bowl XLVI was a showcase for anything this year, it was for how strategy has evolved alongside the players and the situations of the game.

Both offensively and defensively, we saw an approach rarely employed before in this contest that is contrary to all the fundamental teachings of football, a strategy that may become more common if there continues to be great disparity between offensive and defensive talent like we saw all this year in the NFL.

What I am referring to began with 3:46 remaining in the fourth quarter with the Patriots up by two and the Giants needing a field goal or a touchdown to take the lead.

With the completion of five passes, Eli Manning marched the ball downfield and within field-goal range for the Giants with just over a minute left in the game. We then saw a situation arise that you rarely ever see in professional football. The defence of the Patriots wanted the Giants offence to score, and the Giants offence did not want to score. It was almost a standoff of ridiculous proportions.

It is something we have never gone over before in practice -- there is no, "when to let the opponent score" section of the playbook -- but I wouldn't be surprised if it becomes more commonplace in the NFL, especially with record-breaking offences like the Saints and the Patriots. These teams are top-heavy with prolific offences and underperforming defences. When time is expiring in the fourth, when the ball is already in field-goal range and when they are leading by two points or less, it actually makes sense for them to concede a quick seven and get the ball back rather than potentially letting their opponent run out the clock before scoring a chip shot game-winning field goal.

With the game on the line in the final minutes, if you asked any unbalanced football team in the NFL, what do you think they would decide: hope their defence can stop a time-consuming drive and block or force a missed field goal, or give up four extra points quickly and put the ball back in the hands of a Drew Brees or Tom Brady? I'm almost certain they would prefer their chances with their offences and more time remaining and a larger deficit. As long as their team is still within a touchdown after offering up a quick six, I guarantee you they would prefer to take the ball in hand.

With continually improving offences and four downs to get 10 yards, it is not uncommon for teams to put together seven- to nine-minute drives. If your defence is of the bend but don't break design and yields yards like Winnipeg gives out photo-radar tickets, how many times does your franchise quarterback and his record-breaking offence get the ball? Potentially as few as four or five times a game.

In my mind, if you are a team with a top-ranked point producer paired with a bottom-half defence, it behooves you to play very aggressively when defending, especially late in games. This way, you either produce a number of big plays for losses, no gain or a turnover, or your opponent beats you on a big play and quickly gives you possession once again.

From my armchair during the Super Bowl, if I was running the Patriots, I would have done what Bill Belichick did, but sooner. In fact, the moment the Giants got inside the 80 per cent-plus range of their kicker, I would have instructed the defenders to give up the six points immediately.

I would have intentionally given the Giants a four- or six-point lead, but I would have given Tom Brady and the Patriots the final possession of the game with more than two minutes to score a touchdown. And in my mind, the Patriots offence has a much better chance of scoring than the Patriots defence does of stopping a drive, preventing a first down or blocking a kick.

In all my years, I have never been on the field with instructions to let the opposition score and I can't recall the last time I saw our offence intentionally pull up short of the goal-line to run out the clock. But when your offence is that good, your defence that bad and time is running out, these fundamentally backward directives become a new chapter in your playbook that may be employed with more regularity as strategy and the offences in the NFL continue to advance.

Doug Brown, once a hard-hitting defensive lineman and frequently a hard-hitting columnist, usually appears Tuesdays in the Free Press.

Republished from the Winnipeg Free Press print edition February 7, 2012 C4