Eroding financial accountability at the legislature

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This article was published 05/06/2021 (1766 days ago), so information in it may no longer be current.

BUDGET documents describing the taxing and spending decisions of government are voluminous, detailed and grotesquely complicated, which is one reason why so few regular citizens take the time to study them.

This is unfortunate, because how governments raise and spend money is a clearer indication of their real priorities than all the positive, upbeat rhetoric used to “sell” their value-laden budgetary proposals. Budgets are inherently political documents, because they determine who within society pays the costs and enjoys the benefits of government policies and programs.

With respect to budgets, the government proposes and the legislature disposes. For centuries, it has been recognized that the most fundamental purpose of the legislature is to review and approve taxing and spending decisions made by the Crown, which in contemporary circumstances means the premier and the cabinet.

Over time, an insistence on narrowly defined financial accountability was gradually broadened to cover wider aspects of government performance, such as the effectiveness and equity of policies and programs.

On an annual basis, the government presents the legislature with a budget, proposing tax and spending changes. The premier and other ministers are then expected to explain and defend their budgetary choices.

The focus here is on the spending side of the budget. When the government presents the budget, it also tables forecasts of planned spending in documents called “the estimates.” The process by which the legislature reviews and votes on the estimates is called the supply process. For a number of reasons, most informed observers regard the supply process as the weakest part of contemporary parliamentary democracy.

Now the Pallister government is weakening that process even further, by withholding crucial financial information that should, by tradition, be made available before the legislature votes on the budget. On April 26, the Opposition NDP raised a point of privilege with the Speaker of the legislature that the government had unilaterally modified the estimates by removing crucial information related to spending on the pandemic and the recession.

For example, the estimates document for the Health and Seniors Care department shrank from 145 pages in 2020 to only 32 pages this year.

The NDP’s point of privilege was serious and substantive. Failure to provide such information compromises the authority of the legislature and the capacity of individual MLAs to represent their constituencies. It is usually assumed that the opposition alone scrutinizes spending, but in fact it is the job of all MLAs, including government MLAs, to enforce the principle of financial accountability.

The government claims the streamlined estimates format represents “best practice” in other Canadian jurisdictions. The opposition is rightly suspicious, however, that this is an opportunistic attempt by the government to evade criticism by withholding information about emergency spending, both increases and decreases, that affect the lives and livelihoods of Manitobans.

On May 10, the Speaker offered a small rebuke to the government by ruling that it had the authority to alter the estimates format, but “as a courtesy” should have consulted the opposition in advance. She stated she has no authority to remedy the dispute.

If the government sincerely wants to improve the supply process, it should commit to an all-party review of the rules and procedures involved. Currently, the committee of supply meets in three separate sections to scrutinize and approve the estimates of the various government departments.

Based on the principle that only ministers can initiate spending, committees of supply can only recommend defeat or reductions to the estimates. Governments use their majorities on the committees to prevent this from happening. After the committee stage, the procedure for final approval of the estimates is technical and complicated. Suffice to say, it involves two stages of debate with individual speeches limited to five minutes. Once time elapses, votes are held and the government gets the money it needs to operate.

There is a highly ritualistic quality to the annual supply processes. It is simply not realistic to expect 57 MLAs to review a $19-billion budget in detail. There are not enough MLAs committed to the difficult task. There is not enough time. MLAs lack the staff to help with understanding budgetary complexities. Governments of all partisan persuasions do not encourage in-depth reviews of their spending plans.

Recognizing these realities, I recommend that the legislature create a standing committee on public finances that would examine the estimates of select few departments on a rotational basis over several years. Membership on the committee would be comprised of 10 to 15 MLAs representing all parties, chosen based on their willingness to learn about public finances.

Instead of detailed reviews, the committee should focus on major shifts in spending, evidence on the effectiveness of programs and administrative problems that might be identified. A small staff of two or three professionals could provide research support. There could still be a number of hours of supply debate in the full legislature, in which the parties could publicize their philosophical disagreements over budget priorities.

These changes would allow for more meaningful financial accountability than currently exists.

Paul G. Thomas is professor emeritus of political studies at the University of Manitoba.