China’s deepening presence in the Americas

Opinion

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This article was published 06/07/2023 (824 days ago), so information in it may no longer be current.

There is increasing concern in western capitals over the growing footprint of China in Latin America and the Caribbean. The fact is that Beijing has been expanding and deepening its presence in the region for many years.

Unlike Russian engagement in the hemisphere, the Chinese have focused mostly on economic or commercial linkages. It is clearly not about China bolstering its military ties in the region. At least not yet.

It also doesn’t hurt that Beijing can foster bilateral relations with Latin American countries and thereby weaken, or even undermine, their interactions with its leading rival, the United States. China undoubtedly sees these relationship-building exercises in zero-sum terms — or as offering an attractive alternative to connections with the U.S. government. Stated differently, it’s about China finding a way of messing around in America’s “backyard” or sphere of influence.

There are 20 countries in the region (out of 33) that are now full partners in China’s expanding Belt and Road Initiative.

In 2021, China’s two-way trade with Latin America exceeded US$450 billion — and is set to top US$700 billion by 2035. From an investment standpoint, China-based companies have poured in US$160 billion since 2000 in countries such as Brazil, Mexico and Argentina, while Chinese banks have provided more than US$141 billion in loan commitments since 2005.

It is true the Chinese have been heavily criticized for engaging in unadulterated “debt diplomacy,” but their core objective is to create as many pressure points as possible with countries in the Americas. In general, Beijing has tried to insinuate itself — so as to advance its own narrow interests — into large-scale resource-extraction (especially lithium deposits), agricultural and infrastructure projects.

By doing so, China hopes to strengthen diplomatic and people-to-people relations in an effort to secure the allegiance and backing of these countries. Simply put, it wants to obtain leverage over these same countries and thus gain some measure of control over their policy decisions.

This can obviously come in handy when seeking to consolidate preferential terms of commerce and investment opportunities. It also provides Beijing with anticipated diplomatic cover or support within international institutions such as the United Nations and the Organization of American States. For China, then, it’s all about maximizing its economic power to buy influence and much-needed resources.

If ever you needed confirmation of this point, just look at two recent examples: the February radio silence over the flight of a Chinese spy balloon over four Latin American countries (Venezuela, Costa Rica, Colombia and Nicaragua) and Honduras’ March decision to sever its diplomatic relations with Taiwan. In both of these cases, the steady growth of China’s political influence and its ability to dangle economic incentives were front and centre.

In a region of the world that is understandably sensitive about outside interference and political sovereignty, it was striking to see the absence of any stiff governmental condemnation of China’s balloon misadventure. No shooting down of the high-altitude object; no major opposition or media outcry; and no calls to cut diplomatic relations with Beijing. Instead, there was a collective yawn and a back-to-business mentality.

The response from those countries was also muted because of their unwillingness to rock the Chinese boat. They clearly understood that expanding economic ties with Beijing outweighed any loss to their respective national sovereignty and territorial integrity. Put another way, near silence is the price you have to pay for opening your door to a larger Chinese presence.

With respect to Honduras, sitting President Xiomara Castro simply calculated that establishing diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China (and thus ditching Taipei) would pay higher financial dividends. It also appeared to be a bidding war between Taiwan and China, though one in which Taipei never really had a chance.

During Honduran Foreign Minister Eduardo Enrique Reina’s late March visit to Beijing, the Chinese foreign ministry basically confirmed as much when it issued a statement reiterating that China “stands ready to enhance friendly co-operation with Honduras in various fields to the benefit of our two countries and peoples.” In addition, Honduras’ embrace of China was an unmistakeable slap in the face to official Washington — and one that was most welcomed by the top leadership in Beijing.

Moreover, you can rest assured China is not going to stop pushing the hemispheric envelope. The U.S. government does not want to China entrenching its dominance to a point where it becomes irreversible. It also can’t lose sight of the fact that in an arguably multipolar world, the U.S. needs all the allies it can muster.

If anything, China’s warm embrace of the Americas is a powerful reminder that Washington has for too long neglected what it is happening in its neighbourhood. It needs to get back in the hemispheric game and once again craft its own “good neighbour” policy toward Latin America. This is definitely not the time for taking a “siesta” on a region so integral to U.S. and western interests.

Peter McKenna is professor of political science at the University of Prince Edward Island in Charlottetown.