Could market forces change Cuban policy?
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Hey there, time traveller!
This article was published 17/02/2024 (598 days ago), so information in it may no longer be current.
It was one of those magical moments in my Cuban Foreign Policy course when a single question precipitated a spirited classroom discussion. I simply asked: What happens to the nature and direction of Cuba’s external relations if it wholeheartedly embraces unfettered capitalism?
While I gently pushed and prodded the students, there appeared to be a consensus in the room that Cuba’s foreign policy outlook would change quickly and dramatically. Interestingly, a number of international students were convinced that Havana would be unable to resist (or repel) implacable U.S. pressures and demands.
Naturally, I took a different position and argued instead that the Cubans — who I call the great improvisers and shapeshifters of the world — would remain true to their ingrained core values and principles. Much, of course, would depend on how those market forces were introduced, whether the country would gradually open fully to an influx of foreign direct investment in private enterprise, and if the state could control or contain it (or put the capitalist toothpaste back into the socialist tube).
It is worth recalling that a key tenet of the 1959 Cuban Revolution was to rid the country of private businesses and casino capitalism. Indeed, it was to be a new highly centralized system based on state-controlled socialism, state employees and enterprises and an array of state-funded social services and subsidies geared toward the best interests and well-being of the Cuban collective.
Let’s put to one side the debate over whether the theory has actually matched the reality and focus on how the nature and extent of revolutionary Cuba’s foreign policy orientation fundamentally changed. Suffice to say that Fidel Castro immediately expressed support for the struggling peoples of the developing world, decolonization/anti-imperialism and revolutionary/guerrilla movements throughout the Global South.
Furthermore, he ardently embraced a Cuban internationalism that prioritized global solidarity, a responsibility or duty to help others and respectful international co-operation/dialogue. On top of that was layered a critical aim of advancing Cuban independence/sovereignty, an obsession with counter-dependency strategies and locating strategic counterweights and peaceful co-existence.
Can these central Cuban foreign policy tenets survive the introduction of more unadulterated market mechanisms? Put another way, will these long-standing principles disintegrate over time as capitalism’s grip tightens on Cuban society?
Forced to modify its policies in the face of a persistent economic crisis, the Cuban government is now going all in with state-led mass tourism and part way with market capitalism. Over the last three years or so, President Miguel Díaz-Canel has opened space for thousands of small and medium-sized private businesses to take root (e.g., grocery stores, bakeries, restaurants and import operations). Evidently, these outfits are actually hiring more people (over 1.5 million workers) than Cuban state-owned enterprises.
Cuban private entrepreneurs, according to Cuba’s Economy Minister Alejandro Gil, are purchasing over a billion dollars in imports annually. By this measure, the nascent Cuban private sector is replacing the state as the country’s largest importer. Oniel Díaz, who runs a private accounting and design business in Havana, told the Miami Herald the following: “It is an unprecedented change, a paradigm shift in Cuba.”
Rumours are also swirling in Havana that the Cuban government is ready to permit Cuban-Americans to actually invest (and perhaps even own) private businesses in Cuba. We’ll see.
So allow me to reference one important area of Cuban foreign policy that might be susceptible to significant change if market capitalism takes hold — to wit, Cuba’s vaunted medical internationalism or “white coat diplomacy.” Would Havana’s willingness to cover the costs of sending medical professionals to heal the sick in the Global South gradually end? Would the country stop providing critically important pharmaceuticals (such as meningitis and COVID vaccines) to poorer countries that can’t afford to pay?
Not only did the majority of my students believe so, but they also predicted that a capitalist Cuba would be more likely to side with the U.S. and its core economic/security interests in the world. The thinking here was that Cuba would inevitably become more reliant/dependent on U.S. market access, direct investment and durables — not unlike Canada — and thus become more vulnerable to Washington’s insistence on not charting a more independent foreign policy thrust.
By early February, though, the “old guard” Cuban political leadership — under tremendous economic and financial pressure — opted to curb the introduction of market capitalism for now. Instead, it put in place a steep increase in gasoline/diesel prices, hiked the fares for trains and interprovincial buses, and enacted measures to limit the growth of the private sector.
Still, it is possible that Cuban foreign policy could take on a different complexion and set of overarching aims within a larger capitalist space. Internal pressures are certainly building. But it is also possible that those entrenched Cuban values of helping others in times of need, community-orientation and a general decency will hold up against the sharper edges of market forces.
Peter McKenna is professor of political science at the University of Prince Edward Island in Charlottetown.